As the realization of potential resource and transit activity set in over the years, stakeholders looked for answers from various public and private sector organizations. Years of dialogue about a variety of surface-associated maritime issues occurred, yet there has been a consistent absence of discussion about the US Navy (USN) with regard to its expected role. The conventional wisdom, and lack of specified requirements, is that USN sub-surface and aerospace military capabilities are sufficient to meet national defence requirements (with the exception of cruise missile threats). This can be interpreted from the US Navy response relating to the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and subsequent Government Accounting Office (GAO) report. However, critics believe that the USN is ‘dragging anchor’ concerning the North. Th e lack of a surface capability and presence, beyond the statutory purview of the US Coast Guard, might equal a gap in both homeland defence and security that could be exploited by adversaries and/or threatened by disaster incidents.

What is less discussed are the reasons for a careful and measured approach to defining and developing the role of the US Navy in the surface waters of the Arctic Ocean. To that end, this article will explore several factors which influence USN capabilities and presence within the Arctic. These factors include: (1) the global maritime mission within the context of the Arctic; (2) the absence of a naval general-officer/flag-officer (GO/FO) command structure for the Arctic, as well as existing bifurcated combatant command boundaries; (3) the lack of infrastructure support;(4) the issue of funding for a defi ned Arctic mission; and (5) the overall distaste for building polar-class vessels with inherently decreased operational capabilities compared to the rest of the fleet.